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THE POLITICS OF PAIN: RHETORIC OR REFORM?
Ben A. Rich*
INTRODUCTION
A remarkable and disturbing phenomenon slowly crept into the
collective consciousness of the American public in the last decade of
the 201h Century: health care institutions and professionals, physicians
in particular, did not take the relief of patient pain and suffering
seriously. Documentary and statistical evidence of this phenomenon
had been developing in the literature of the health professions decades
earlier, but apparently without impact on individual practice or
institutional policy.' Suffering patients and their families labored under
the mistaken assumption that unrelieved pain, however significant or
prolonged, was an unavoidable artifact of serious acute and chronic
illness.2 This was a reasonable assumption inasmuch as one of the core
principles of medical ethics was beneficence, the duty of the physician
to act only in the patient's best interest. 3 Surely such a duty would
include the professional responsibility to alleviate pain and suffering to
the greatest extent possible. But as the documentation of a widespread
pattern and practice of undertreating pain continued to mount, the
existence of a genuine and pervasive public health problem of major
proportions became undeniable.5

. Associate Professor of Bioethics, University of California, Davis
School of
Medicine; Visiting Professor, University of California, Davis School of Law.

1 See, e.g. Richard Marks & Edward Sachar, Undertreatment of Medical Inpatients

with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS INT. MED. 173 (1973); Ronald Melzack, The
Tragedy of Needless Pain, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 27.
2 Ree Dawson, et al., Probingthe Paradox of Patients' Satisfaction with
Inadequate
Pain Management, 23 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT 211, 212 (2002).
3 For an authoritative and exhaustive discussion of beneficence see TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS ( 4 th ed.

1994).

4 The fallacy of this assumption was initially posited by the physician Eric Cassel,

who observed that the relief of pain and suffering was presumed to be among the
highest priorities of clinical medicine by patients and lay persons, but not by
physicians. Eric Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306
NEW ENG. J. MED 639, 640 (1982).
5 N.Y. Public Health Council, Breaking Down the Barriers to Effective Pain
Management,Report to the Commissioner of Health (1998).
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The decade of the 1990's proved to be a watershed, with a
remarkable number and diversity of professional and policy initiatives
directed at what had finally come to be recognized, at least by the
cognoscente in pain and palliative medicine, as an epidemic of
undertreated pain. Mid-way into the decade following this relatively
frenetic period, a decade fortuitously identified by the Congress of the
United States as "The Decade of Pain Control and Research," it is
appropriate to consider what improvements, if any, this activity has
produced, and to seek to ascertain whether public policy is an effective
6
means of changing health care professional and institutional practice.
Section I of this article undertakes a form of root cause analysis
of the phenomenon of undertreated pain in the healthcare setting, based
upon the premise that an accurate assessment of the nature of the
problem is essential to the formulation and implementation of any
remedial measures, regardless of whether or not they take the form of
law, regulation, public policy, or more clinically oriented approaches
such as clinical practice guidelines or practice parameters. The
particular focus will be on the "why" aspect of the problem.7 Section II
reviews examples of legislative approaches to the problem, with
particular focus on two types of statutes - those dealing with so-called
"intractable pain" and those addressing inadequacies in physician
education and training. Section III considers the approach of the Joint
Commission for the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
(JCAHO), i.e., the incorporation of criteria for institutional pain
management policies and protocols into its accreditation manual.
Section IV discusses the formulation of model physician practice
guidelines, in particular those developed by the Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research (AHCPR) and the Federation of State Medical
Licensing Boards (FSMLB). Section V considers the concept of
balance that has become a widely accepted model for evaluating and
reforming state and federal policies affecting pain management and
drug diversion. The Conclusion will review the progress, or lack
thereof, brought about by these policy initiatives, and propose
modifications to existing approaches that might increase the likelihood
of further improvements in the second half of the Decade of Pain
Control and Research and beyond.

6

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,

Title VI, Sec. 1603, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
7 See, e.g., ABS GROUP, INC., ROOT CAUSE

ANALYSIS HANDBOOK (1999).
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I.

ORIGINS OF THE CULTURE OF PAIN

Deeply embedded in the moral core of ancient medicine is the
physician's responsibility to relieve pain and suffering. 8 Interestingly,
the duty of the health care professional to relieve pain and suffering is
offered as a self-evident truism rather than analyzed or argued for
through carefully crafted analysis. 9 With the discovery of the
miraculous powers of some naturally occurring substances to relieve
even the most severe pain, particularly opium and its most important
ingredient - morphine, physicians were almost always able to respond
compassionately to alleviate suffering even when they could not cure
or significantly affect the progression of disease. 10 Yet by the final
decades of the past century, a period in which advances in medical
science and technology were being made at an unprecedented pace,
pain relief seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. In order to
understand this bizarre phenomenon, I consider the barriers to pain
relief that have been consistently identified in the professional
literature. Before doing so, however, it is important to understand the
categories into which pain states are routinely divided.
In 1986, a National Institute of Health consensus conference
recommended that pain be differentiated as either: acute pain, chronic
pain not associated with malignant disease, and chronic pain associated
with malignant disease (cancer pain).11 Acute pain is usually the result
of trauma, surgery, or an acute episode of illness. Cancer pain is often
considered the primary component of the entire range of conditions
associated with terminal illness, even though modem therapies have
enabled many patients to survive years and even decades after a cancer
diagnosis. Chronic nonmalignant pain is pain that is not associated with
cancer or other life-threatening conditions and which lasts for more
8 Cassell, supra note 4..
9 Eric Cassel, for example, cites no authority for the proposition that "[t]he obligation
of physicians to relieve human suffering stretches back into antiquity." Cassel, supra
note 4, at 639. Similarly, in what appears to be one of the earliest articles devoted
exclusively to the duty to relieve pain and suffering, the author, an academic
philosopher, states without further authoritative reference that "there is a broadly
based humanistic ethics which applies to the domain of medical care which gives
patients a strong prima facie right to freedom from unnecessary pain .... " Rem B.
Edwards, Pain and the Ethics of Pain Management, 18 SOC. SCI. & MED. 515, 517
(1984).
10 ScoTT FISHMAN, THE WAR ON PAIN 33-35 (2000).
1 National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference, The Integrated
Approach to the Management of Pain,2 J PAIN & SYMP. MGMT. 35 (1987).
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than six months. These categories of pain are to be distinguished from
the classification of pain according to the mechanism involved in its
generation. In such a classificatory scheme, nociceptive pain is that
which arises from tissue injury. 12 Nociceptive pain has the attribute of
usually being commensurate in its severity with the demonstrable tissue
damage, thereby lending an aura of authenticity to the pain levels
reported by the patient. Neuropathic pain, caused by a disorder of the
sensory processing of the central nervous system, is often inconsistent
with the extent of physical injury. For reasons that will be made clear
in subsequent sections of this article, this aspect of nociceptive pain
poses serious problems for pain patients in securing treatment.
The categories (acute, chronic nonmalignant, cancer), to a
greater extent than the classifications (nociceptive and neuropathic),
have a greater pragmatic than clinical significance because of the
attitudes many physicians have about them. Pain associated with
surgery or trauma has a clear physiological basis and a time-limited
duration in which strong analgesics may be required for effective
management. Physicians have generally been more willing to
acknowledge and address this type of pain. Pain whose source is
cancer or terminal illness, while also associated with a clear
physiological basis, has tended to be managed more tentatively and
cautiously, even by oncologists who are presumed to be the most3
knowledgeable of physicians in the proper care of such patients.'
Chronic nonmalignant pain is the most problematic because, among
other reasons, there are often no physiological findings that are
considered by physicians to be commensurate with the patient's reports
of the nature, severity, and persistence of the pain. 1 Chronic pain
patients are most vulnerable to charges of "drug-seeking" behavior, and
the most likely to be the victims of pseudo-addiction.' While there is
compelling evidence that all types of pain have been undertreated,
12 CAROL A. WARFIELD & ZAHID H. BAJWA, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE OF PAIN
MEDICINE 55 ( 2 nd ed. 2004).

13 Charles S. Cleeland, et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic
Cancer,330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592, 595 (1994).
14 Dennis C. Turk and Akiko Okifuji, ClinicalAssessment of the Person with Chronic

Pain, in Troels Jensen, et al., eds) CLINICAL PAIN MANAGEMENT - CHRONIC
PAIN 89 (2003).
15Pseudo-addiction is an iatrogenic condition in which a patient with genuine pain
that has not been adequately treated manifests behaviors similar to patients with
addiction disorders. See David E. Weissman & J. David Haddox, Opioid
Pseudoaddiction-An latrogenicSyndrome, 36 PAIN 363 (1989).
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chronic nonmalignant pain is by far the most problematic. In Section II
of this article I will consider a type of legislation specifically targeted at
this type of pain.
Remarkably, one of the most consistently cited barriers to
effective pain relief in patient care is lack of physician knowledge and
skill in the assessment and management of pain. It is remarkable
because of the ostensible status of the relief of suffering among the core
values of medicine, and because pain is the most common reason why
patients seek out the care of physicians. 16 Nevertheless, medical school
curricula continue, as they have for decades, to be virtually devoid of
required courses, as opposed to occasional lectures in more traditional
courses, in the assessment and management of pain. 17 When academic
physicians cultivate their ignorance of the remarkable advances in pain
pharmacotherapy, the result is the perpetuation, from one generation of
physicians to another, of an incredible amount of myth and
misinformation about the proper role of opioid analgesics in the
management of pain.. 18 Among the more prevalent, persistent, and
pernicious myths harbored by academic and nonacademic physicians
alike are the following:
"

*

*
*

opioid analgesics, even when appropriately prescribed to
patients with moderate to severe pain, are highly
19
addictive
the risk of respiratory depression from opioids seriously
outweighs the benefit of analgesia in many seriously ill
patients, even with careful monitoring in the inpatient
20
setting
there is a maximum tolerable 2dose
of morphine
1
regardless of the severity of the pain
unrelieved pain poses no risks of adverse outcomes that
are commensurate with the risks of long-term opioid
use

22

16 DAVID B. MoRRIs, ILLNESS AND CULTURE IN THE POSTMODERN AGE

108 (1998).

17 Richard S. Weiner, An Interview with John J Bonica, MD., 1 PAIN PRAC. 2 (1989).
18 C.

Stratton Hill, Jr., When Will Adequate Pain Treatment Be the Norm?, 274 JAMA

1881, 1881 (1995).

19 Jane Porter and Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics,

302 NEW ENG. J.
20

MED.

123, 123 (1980).

Susan A. Fohr, The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Separating Myth from

Reality, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 315, 317-18 (1998).
21 Jane C. Ballantyne & Jianren Mao, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain, 349 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1943, 1948 (2003).
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In both Sections II and III, I will consider initiatives intended to
address, in part, the persistent problem of clinician ignorance about
state-of-the-art pain assessment and management strategies.
A second barrier to effective pain relief has been identified as
the failure to make pain relief a priority in patient care. This barrier, as
with the first, is highly paradoxical if the relief of pain and suffering is,
in fact, a core value of medicine. Either it is a core value only in some
ethereal, aspirational sense, or it is a core value that is routinely
violated in everyday practice. To some extent, there may be a false
dilemma posed by the persistence of the first, second, and fourth of the
myths noted above. One of the ancient maxims of medical practice is
primum non nocere (first do no harm).23 The phrase falsely suggests
that a medical intervention may only be undertaken when it poses no
material risk of harm to the patient. To the contrary, what is required is
an appropriate risk-benefit analysis, in which the known risks are
deemed to be outweighed by the anticipated benefits. A physician in
the grip of the erroneous belief that opioid analgesia of more than a few
days duration is highly likely to produce addiction, or that unrelieved
pain poses no physiological risks and only negligible psychological
ones, will believe that the primary duty to "do no harm" will justify.the
decision not to adequately relieve pain that requires the use of opioids.
In Section III of this article I will consider a regulatory approach to
institutionalizing the duty to provide appropriate pain relief.
The last of the physician-centered barriers is the fear of
regulatory scrutiny and/or legal liability. The nidus of this fear is the
prescribing of opioid analgesics, particularly those identified by the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as Schedule 24
II
narcotics by authority of the federal Controlled Substances Act.
Schedule II drugs include those that are most effective in controlling
moderate to severe pain such as Morphine and Oxycodone. Because of
what the DEA considers to be the high potential for abuse of drugs
placed in Schedule II, there is a widespread belief among physicians
that their prescribing practices with regard to them are carefully
monitored. This perceived regulatory scrutiny, in combination with the
myths and misinformation about the risks of opioids, has caused, or at
least significantly contributed to, a phenomenon known as
22

Patricia Berry & June Dahl, The New JCAHO Pain Standards: Implicationsfor

Pain ManagementNurses, 1 PAIN MGMT NURSING 3 (2000).
23

TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

189 (4th ed. 1994).
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat 1242 (1970).

24
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"opiophobia. ' '25 The DEA is not the only regulatory agency whose
vigilance, real or imagined, has profoundly influenced physician
practice in the prescribing of opioid analgesics. 26 State medical
licensing boards, in the very decades in which an epidemic of
undertreated pain was being reported, established a pattern and practice
of taking draconian disciplinary actions against their licensees for
alleged instances of "overprescribing" opioid analgesics.27 Some
physicians who have been the victims of such proceedings have
successfully challenged them, and in doing so elicited from courts
highly critical commentary about the prevailing attitudes of medical
board members toward progressive efforts to manage moderate to
severe chronic pain. with opioids when weaker analgesics have
demonstrably failed 8 These disciplinary proceedings sometimes reveal
a failure of state medical board members to apprise themselves of
recent developments in pain management and more enlightened views
among pain medicine experts about the role of opioid analgesics in the
management of moderate to severe pain, whether or not it is associated
with a terminal or life-threatening illness.2 9 The result of widespread
and highly publicized disciplinary proceedings against physicians for
purported "overprescribing" has been the encouragement of the
diametric opposite, or underprescribing.
In Section II I will consider
25

See John P. Morgan, American Opiophobia: Customary Underutilizationof Opioid

Analgesics, 11 ADV. PAIN RES. & THERAPY 181 (1989).
26

See David E. Joranson, Regulatory Influence on Pain Management: Real or

Imagined?, 1 J. PHARM. CARE IN PAIN & SYMP. CONTROL 113 (1993).
27 One Executive Director of a state medical licensing board went so far as to describe
an "ethic of underprescribing" that has come to characterize the attitudes of many
state medical licensing boards. Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethics for
Treating Patientswith Chronic Pain: What Can MedicalBoards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. &
ETHics 332, 336 (1998).
28 See, e.g., Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380,
1385 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), where the court, in reversing the board's disciplinary measures
against Dr. Hoover, criticized the board's "draconian policy of policing pain
prescription practice[s]" and found that the board had "once again engaged in the
uniformly rejected practice of overzealously supplanting a hearing officer's valid
findings of fact regarding a doctor's prescribing practices with its own opinion in a
case founded on a woefully inadequate quantum of evidence."
29 David E. Joranson, et al., Opioids for Chronic Cancer and Non-Cancer
Pain: A
Survey of State Medical Board Members, 79 FED. BULL. 15, 34 (June 1992); Aaron
M. Gilson and David E. Joranson, Controlled Substances and Pain Management:
Changes in Knowledge and Attitudes of State Medical Regulators, 21 J. PAIN &
SYMP. MGMT. 227, 234 (2001).
30 Flora J. Skelly, Fear of Sanctions Limits PrescribingPain Drugs, 37 AM. MED.
NEWS, Aug. 15, 1994, at 19; C. Stratton Hill, Jr., Government Regulatory Influences
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state legislation specifically intended to address this phenomenon
among state medical boards.
Before concluding Section I, it is important to anticipate the
criticism that too much blame is being placed on physicians - either in
their role as practitioners, medical school faculty, or as medical board
members - as the sole or most significant source of the problem of
undertreated pain. Certainly other barriers not directly linked to
physicians have been identified. These include, among others, financial
and insurance coverage considerations 31 and the reluctance of patients
and/or their families to consider the use of opioid analgesics on a
sustained basis. 32 However, with regard to financial or insurance
coverage constraints, the pervasive phenomenon of undertreated pain
pre-dates the rise of managed care or the imposition of cost
containment mechanisms as a dimension of health care reimbursement
policy. Furthermore, while it is true that opiophobia afflicts patients
and their families, and indeed some cultures, there is no evidence to
support the argument that knowledgeable, compassionate physicians
cannot help patients and their families to appreciate the importance of
effective pain management to good patient care. Practicing physicians
have also maintained that the alleged hyperscrutiny of their opioid
prescribing practices, particularly through the imposition of multiple
copy prescription form requirements by some states on Schedule II
drugs, justifies their practice of utilizing smaller doses and
weaker
33
analgesics in their efforts to manage the pain of their patients.
In portions of Section II and IV I consider the legitimacy and
efficacy of legislative and regulatory measures to influence physician
practice. In that context I will take note of the legal and ethical
on Opioid Prescribingand Their Impact on the Treatment of Pain of Nonmalignant
Origin, 11 J. PAIN & SYMP. MGMT. 287, 289 (May 1996).
31 See David E. Joranson, Are Health Care Reimbursement Policies a Barrier to Acute

and Chronic Pain Management?, 9 J. PAIN & SYMP. MGMT. 244 (1994); Diane E.
Hoffmann, Pain Management and Palliative Care in the Era of Managed Care:
Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267 (1998); Timothy S. Jost,
Public Financingof Pain Management: Leaky Umbrellas and Ragged Safety Nets, 26
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290 (1998).
32 See Linda Post Farber, et al., Pain: Ethics, Culture andInformed
Consent to Relief,
24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 348 (1996).

Multiple copy prescription forms, often referred to as "triplicates" because the most
common type requires the use of a special prescription pad that generates 3 copies,
one of which goes to a designated state or law enforcement agency which can thereby
monitor the prescribing practice of each physician. See H.I. SCHWARTZ, PSYCHIATRIC
PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA, AND SPECIAL
INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THERAPIES (1994).
33
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implications of a custom and practice among physicians that appears to
countenance, indeed, to justify unnecessary suffering on the part of
patients as a means of assuaging
physicians' anxiety and minimizing
34
liability.
of
risk
perceived
their
II.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO UNDERTREATED
PAIN

The initial wave of legislation addressing the phenomenon of
undertreated pain began in 1989 with the enactment by the Texas
legislature of the first of what has come to be known generically as
intractable pain treatment acts (IPTA).3 5 IPTA legislation was a direct
response to the chilling effect on pain management produced by state
medical
licensing board disciplinary
actions
for so-called
"overprescribing" of opioid analgesics. Intractable pain was defined as
''a pain state in which the cause of the pain cannot be removed or
otherwise treated and which in the generally accepted course of
medical practice no relief or cure of the cause of the pain is possible or
none has been found after reasonable efforts. '36 The thrust of this
definition is to reconceptualize chronic nonmalignant pain as a
condition to be treated rather than a symptom of an underlying
condition. The critical public policy component of an IPTA is the
provision stating: "No physician may be subject to disciplinary action
by the board for prescribing or administering dangerous drugs or
controlled substances in the course of treatment of a person for
intractable pain.3 7
Following the lead of Texas, other states enacted similar
statutes early in the decade of the 1990s. 38 While hardly a trend that
eventually made such legislation, or the public policy that such statutes
espouse a majority view, IPTAs have fostered closer scrutiny of the
problem of undertreated pain, the extent to which it is in part a product
34 See Ben A. Rich, An Ethical Analysis to the Barriers of Effective
Pain

Management, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 54 (2000); See Barry R.
Furrow, Pain Management and ProviderLiability: No More Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 28 (2001).
35 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 4495c (Vernon 1996).
36
37

Id. § 2(3).

Id. § 5.
38 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.326 (West
1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 334.105 (West 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.3066 (1995);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.3-01 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.474 (1995); VA. CODE

ANN. § 54.1-3408.1 (Michie 1995).
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of medical board hyper-scrutiny of opioid prescribing practices, as well
as other factors that influence the care of patients with pain. In addition
to becoming the second state to enact an IPTA, California shortly
thereafter convened a statewide summit on effective pain management
that included participants from the health professions, professional
education, legislative bodies and regulatory agencies. 39 The summit
report was both bold and sweeping in its recommendations. In addition
to obvious reforms such as replacing the state imposed triplicate
prescription form for Schedule II narcotics, it advocated the creation,
by statute, of a positive legal duty on the part of physicians to
effectively treat pain and suffering. 40 Spurred by this new emphasis on
the importance of pain management in patient care, the California
licensing boards for physicians, nurses, and pharmacists promptly
promulgated guidelines
for the appropriate use of opioids in the
41
treatment of pain.
IPTAs are not without potential problems. Typical provisions in
such statutes either state or strongly imply that opioid analgesia is a
treatment of last resort for serious chronic nonmalignant pain, with
virtually no guidance to the physician (either in the statute or in other
regulations or guidelines) as to what constitutes a reasonable effort to
utilize non-opioid therapies. 42 Even the choice of terms such as
"dangerous drugs and controlled substances" sends a strong and
somewhat misleading message that opioid analgesics are in a class by
themselves in the risks of harm that they pose to patients. 43 In 1995,
under the sponsorship of the Mayday Fund and the Emily Davie and
Joseph S. Kornfeld Foundation, The Project on Legal Constraints on
Access to Effective Pain Relief developed a model Pain Relief Act.4 4
The model act recognizes the important role of state legislation in the
empowerment of physicians to provide appropriate pain relief to their
patients, while at the same time acknowledging serious limitations in
the IPTA approach.
Among the limitations addressed in the model act is the failure
to make the provisions applicable to all health care professionals who
State of California Department of Consumer Affairs, Summit on Effective Pain
Management:
Removing Impediments to AppropriatePrescribing,July 29, 1994.
40
Id. at 11, 13.
41 David Joranson, IntractablePain Treatment Laws and Regulations, 5 APS BULL. 1,
2 (1995).
42 Id.
43 See supra note 30.
44 See Sandra H. Johnson, DisciplinaryActions and Pain Relief- Analysis of the Pain
ReliefAct, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHics 319 (1996).
39
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may be involved in the process of prescribing and administering opioid
analgesics, i.e., physicians, nurses, and pharmacists. While some states
may have consistent policies in place that govern each of these
professional groups, the more likely situation is that such policies may
be inconsistent if they exist at all.45 In California recently, for example,
the state medical board declined to take disciplinary action against a
physician who replaced a patient's opioid analgesic with a placebo
without informed consent, yet the state nursing board initiated
disciplinary proceedings against nurses who administered the placebo
pursuant to the physician's order.46
A second limitation is the common failure of IPTAs or
implementing regulations to clearly set forth the standards by which a
physician's prescribing practices will be measured. Merely relying
upon stock phrases such as consistent with what a "reasonably prudent
physician would do under such circumstances" is particularly
inadequate in the area of pain management with opioids because the
well-established custom and practice has been undertreatment.47 The
model act, by contrast, protects physicians who can demonstrate
"substantial compliance" with an "acceptable guideline for pain
management. 48 Prime examples of such guidelines, which themselves
have been referenced by state medical board pain policies as guides for
physicians to follow, are those developed by the Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research (now the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality).49
The impact of the handful of IPTAs adopted by states is
difficult to measure. 50 States that have enacted them but continued to
encounter problems of undertreatment have resorted to other legislative
measures. A prime example is the State of California, which in the last
5-7 years has been particularly active on the pain policy front.
David E. Joranson and Aaron M. Gilson, Pharmacists' Knowledge and Attitudes
about Opioid Pain Medications in Relation to Federal and State Pain Policy, 41 J.
AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOC. 213, 219 (2001).
46 Ben A. Rich, A Placebo for the Pain: A Medico-legal Case Analysis, 4 PAIN
45

MEDICINE 366, 368 (2003).

See generally Ben A. Rich, A Prescriptionfor the Pain: The Emerging Standardof
Carefor Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1 (2000).
48 Project on Legal Constraints on Access to Effective Pain Management, The Pain
ReliefAct, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 317, 318 (1996).
49 Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Acute Pain Management: Operative
or Medical Procedures and Trauma (1992); Agency for Health Care Quality and
Research, Management of CancerPain (1994).
50 David E. Joranson and Aaron M. Gilson, State Intractable Pain Policy: Current
Status, 7 APS BULL. 7 (1997).
47
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Continuing the reform spirit engendered by the 1994 Pain Summit, in
1997 the California Assembly enacted the Pain Patients Bill of
Rights. 51 However, the title promises much more than the legislation
delivers. While the importance of pain relief to patient care is
emphasized, and the need to make opioid analagesia available to
patients with serious chronic pain problems is reinforced, the act
permits physicians to refuse to prescribe opioids, presumably even
when medically indicated, so long as the patient is informed that there
are physicians who specialize in the treatment of severe chronic pain
from whom treatment may be sought. 52 The legislation, rather than
emphasizing the responsibility of all physicians to assess and treat pain
promptly, effectively, and for as long as the pain persists," consistent
with the guidelines of the California Medical Board,53 instead suggests
that treatment of pain, particularly chronic nonmalignant pain that
requires opioids for effective relief, is something that physicians may
eschew without adverse consequences (to them).
In 2001, a jury verdict against a physician for elder abuse sent
shock waves through the medical community and prompted further
action by the California Assembly. 54 The case involved an 85-year old
man who was hospitalized with severe pain. He had multiple symptoms
indicative of lung cancer. Throughout his 5-day hospital stay, nurses
charted his pain in the moderate to severe range, yet his physician never
changed the standing order for Demerol, 25-50 mg every 4 hours "as
needed." 55 Both in the Emergency Room prior to admission, and at
home in the few days before his death while receiving hospice care, the
56
patient achieved pain relief with administrations of morphine.
Following his death, the family filed a complaint against the treating
physician with the Medical Board of California. When the Board
agreed with the family's expert that the pain management in the case
51

Pain Patients Bill of Rights,

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

124960 (West 1997).

id.
California Medical Board, Guideline for Prescribing Controlled Substances for
IntractablePain, 51 ACTION REPORT 1, 8 (1994).
54 Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 1999).1
55 A widely recognized approach to assessing pain is a 10-point scale with 0 being no
pain and 10 being the worst pain one can imagine. Levels in the 1-3 range are
characterized as mild, those in the 4-6 range are as "moderate," and levels above 6 as
"severe". Richard H. Gracely & Patricia J. Wolskee, Semantic Functional
Measurement of Pain: Integrating Perception and Language, 15 PAIN 389, 390
(1983).
52

53

Ben A. Rich, Moral Lessons from the Jury Box, 16 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE
PHARMACOTHERAPY 81 (2002).
56
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had been inadequate but declined to take disciplinary action against the
physician, the family filed suit alleging elder abuse. 57 A jury ruled in
the family's favor and assessed $1.5 million in damages.58
In what appeared to be a direct and immediate response to the
Bergman case, and more particularly the marked disparity between the
response of the California Medical Board and that of the jury,
Assembly Bill 487 was introduced into the California Assembly in
2001. In its original form, the bill mandated the California Medical
Board to, at a minimum, order a physician to complete continuing
medical education in pain management whenever it concluded, upon
complaint, investigation, and expert review, that a physician's
management of a patient's pain had been inadequate. After significant
revision at the behest of the California Medical Association, the
enacted version mandated that all licensed physicians in California,
with the exception of radiologists and pathologists, obtain a minimum
of 12 hours of continuing medical education in pain management and
treatment of terminally ill and dying patients by December 31, 2006." 9
The final version of the bill also charged the Division of Medical
Quality to develop
standards for the review of cases involving pain
60
management.

The premise behind the original version of AB 487 in California
was that the state medical board required legislative prodding in order
to be as zealous in the handling of cases of underprescribing of opioids
as it, and many other boards, had been in the handling of cases of
overprescribing or inappropriate prescribing. The premise behind the
version of AB 487 that ultimately became law was the quite different
one that mandatory continuing professional education changes practice.
57

The lawsuit was filed as an elder abuse, rather than a traditional medical

malpractice claim, because of the vagaries of tort reform legislation in the State of
California. Pursuant to that legislation, damages for pain and suffering arising from
medical negligence are capped at $250,000 and do not survive the death of the
patient. However, the California elder abuse statute allows for the recovery of
damages for pain and suffering resulting from elder abuse to be recovered by the
survivors of the victim. It is also important to note that the California elder abuse
statute, unlike some other states, does not explicitly exclude substandard medical care
from the act or omissions that may constitute elder abuse. However, in order to
establish a claim of elder abuse against a physician in California, it is not sufficient to
show a mere departure from the applicable standard of care. Instead, the plaintiff must
prove a gross departure from the standard.
58 The verdict was subsequently reduced to $250,000 by the trial judge
pursuant to the
statutory cap, but awarded attorneys fees to the plaintiff.
59 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2190.5 (West 2001).
60 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.6 (West 1994).
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That premise is vulnerable to considerable critique. A wealth of data in
the medical literature during the last 15 years reveals that the primary
elements of continuing professional education programs - knowledge
dissemination and attitude adjustment (motivation to change) - do not
consistently, indeed rarely lead to widespread change in clinical
practice. 6 1 The belief that it does has been characterized as "a grand
and prevalent delusion." 62 Theories abound as to what the missing
element or elements are that must be included in order to consistently
translate the dissemination of knowledge and the appropriate
adjustment of attitude into improved professional practice. A vivid
example of what does not work has been provided by a massive project
funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation ten years ago.
The Study to Understand Prognosis, Preferences for Outcome
and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT) was a multi-million dollar, multiyear, multi-institutional review of the quality of intensive care provided
in the United States. The stated purpose of SUPPORT, particularly its
second phase, was to "improve end-of-life decisionmaking and reduce
the frequency of a mechanically supported, painful, and prolonged
dying process. ' 63 Phase I of SUPPORT collected and analyzed data on
over 9000 patients who died in the intensive care unit (ICU) of one of
the five academic medical centers participating in the study over a fouryear period. Among the most significant findings of the investigators
based upon the Phase I data were that Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
orders were often too late in the trajectory of the patient's illness or
were inconsistent with the expressed wishes of the patient, discussion
between treating physicians and patients or their families was
inadequate, and 50% of patients experienced moderate to severe pain in
the last three days of life. 64 With both an intervention and control
61 See, e.g., Mitchell B. Max, Improving Outcomes of Analgesic Treatment: Is

Education Enough?, 113 ANNALS INT. MED. 885 (1990); Lisa Bero, et al., Closing the
Gap Between Research into Practice: An Overview of Systematic Reviews of
Interventions to Promote the Implementation of Research Findings, 317 BRIT. MED. J.
465 (1998); Dave Davis, et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education: Do
Conferences, Workshops, Rounds and Other Traditional Continuing Education
Activities Change Physician Behavior or Health Care Outcomes?, 282 JAMA 867

(1999); Frank Ferris, Charles F. von Gunten, & Linda L. Emanuel, Knowledge:
Insufficient for Change, 4 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 145 (2001); Tara Kennedy, et al.,
Exploring the Gap Between Knowledge and Behavior: A Qualitative Study of

ClinicianAction Following an EducationalIntervention, 79 ACAD. MED. 380 (2004).
62 Ferris, von Gunten, and Emanuel, supranote 58, at 145.
63 SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for
Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients, 247 JAMA 1591, 1592 (1995).
64Id. at 1593-4.
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group, Phase II sought to remediate the deficiencies identified in Phase
I by utilizing a cadre of experienced and specially trained nurses. Their
objective was to facilitate physician-patient and physician-family
communication about prognosis, treatment plans, patient directives and
values, and prompt assessment and management of pain and other
symptoms of distress. 65 In order to address the particularly difficult task
of prognostication in the ICU setting, a state-of-the-art prognostic
instrument was developed by the investigators to be utilized by the
intervention group. 6 6 When SUPPORT investigators analyzed the data
from Phase II, they found no demonstrable improvement in the care
patients in the intervention group received.67 Merely providing more
information to treating physicians, and seeking to facilitate the kind of
interpersonal interactions with seriously ill patients or their families in
which such physicians are not naturally inclined to engage, had no
practical impact on deeply ingrained and embedded practices of critical
care professionals. Among the realizations of the SUPPORT
investigators was that the barriers to change transcend knowledge and
attitudes, 68 and that the target for change in settings such 69as hospital
ICUs should be systems rather than individual practitioners.
The data discussed above strongly suggests that while
professional education is a necessary element of changing physician
practice, it is not sufficient. This is particularly true when physician
practice is driven not just by previous medical training, but also by
deeply entrenched concerns about potential risk and liability arising out
of any material deviation from that custom.

°

The perennial debate

about the optimal approach to improving physician practice has a
multiplicity of issues. Among them are whether change can be achieved
in the short-term or whether it is inevitably incremental, and whether
positive change requires positive reinforcement, or whether negative
65

Id.

66 See William A. Knaus, et al.,

The SUPPORT Prognostic Model: Objective
Estimates of Survival for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Adults, 122 ANNALS INT. MED.

191 (1995). For a discussion of the law and policy implications of prognosis in patient
care see generally Ben A. Rich, Prognosticationin Clinical Medicine: Prophecy or
ProfessionalResponsibility?, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 297 (2002).
67 SUPPORT, supra note 60, at 1595-6.
68 Peter J. Greco & John M. Eisenberg, Changing Physicians' Practices, 329 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1271, 1271 (1993).
69
Joanne Lynn et al., Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions: SUPPORT's
Implicationsfor FutureReform, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y S214, S220 (2000).
70 See Melissa L. Buchan & Susan W. Tolle, Pain Relieffor Dying Persons: Dealing
',with Physicians' Fears and Concerns, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 53 (1995).
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reinforcers can sometimes be efficacious. The majority view has been
that such change comes slowly and by a system of rewards rather than
punishment. This view criticizes lawsuits and disciplinary proceedings
for alleged instances of undertreating pain.
There is at least one area, however, in which negative
reinforcement precipitously changed physician practice on a large
scale. That area is the adoption of multiple copy prescription form
(MCPF) requirements by some states for certain types of narcotics.
While about 20% of the states have had some type of MCPF
requirement at some time during the last 50 years, there has been a
general trend away from those toward electronic monitoring in the last
10-12 years.71 One of the reasons supporting the transition to electronic
monitoring is that they are perceived to be less intrusive and
intimidating to physicians, and hence less of a barrier to appropriate
prescribing. The evidence of the chilling effect of MCPFs is
compelling, and relates directly to the question of what, from a public
policy standpoint, prompts changes in physician behavior. A number of
studies compared physician prescribing practices in the period
immediately before and after the adoption of a MCPF requirement or
the addition of a particular narcotic to a pre-existing requirement. 72 The
remarks were striking and consistent: the volume of prescribing of the
drug or drugs covered by the new MCPF requirement was reduced by
half.73 Unless one assumes that such a substantial percentage of these
narcotics was being prescribed inappropriately by physicians, then the
logical conclusion is that physicians began to prescribe less appropriate
or effective narcotics to their patients in order to avoid the regulatory
scrutiny that they believed was made possible by the MCPF policy. 74 In
either case, the data strongly suggests that the perceived threat of

7 David E. Joranson, et al. Pain Management and Prescription Monitoring, 23 J.

PAIN & SYMP. MGMT. 231, 232-3 (2002).
72

See, e.g., Linda J. Wastila and Christine Bishop, The Influence of Multiple Copy

Prescription on Analgesic Utilization, 4 J. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE IN PAIN &
SYMPTOM CONTROL 5 (1996); Michael Weintraub, et al., Consequences of the 1989
New York State TriplicateBenzodiazapine PrescriptionRegulations, 266 JAMA 2392
(1991); K.A. Siegler, et al., Effect of a Triplicate PrescriptionLaw on Prescribingof
Schedule 1I Drugs, 41 AM. J. PHARMACY 108 (1984).
73 Robert Angarola and David Joranson, State ControlledSubstances Laws and
Pain
Control, 2 AM. PAIN SOC'Y BULL. 10 (1992).
74 See Scott M. Fishman, et al., Regulating Opioid PrescribingThrough Prescription
Monitoring Programs: Balancing Drug Diversion and Treatment of Pain, 5 PAIN
MED. 1526 (2004).
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regulatory scrutiny can rapidly and significantly alter a critical aspect
of physician practice, i.e., prescribing medications for patients.
A quite different approach is one that provides institutional
impetus and support for changes in practice patterns in pain and
symptom management. In section III I consider one of the most recent
and significant.
III.

THE JOINT COMMISSION PAIN STANDARDS

The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) is the pre-eminent national organization that monitors and
certifies the quality of care provided by hospitals in the United States.
So pervasive and dominant is its role that JCAHO accreditation
constitutes compliance with most requirements for Medicare
reimbursement. 75 As a private, not-for-profit entity, JCAHO offers a
kind of self-regulation in that its governing board consists of
individuals appointed by the American Medical Association, the
American Hospital Association, the American College of Surgeons, the
American College of Physicians, and the American Dental
76
Association. 76 Thus, when JCAHO introduces new standards or
priorities for evaluating institutions in its survey process, health care
organizations take notice.
In 1998, JCAHO responded positively to a proposal by certain
faculty of University of Wisconsin to explore what role it might be able
to play in making quality pain management more of a priority in patient
care. With financial support from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, they began a joint project entitled "Institutionalizing Pain
Management." 77 As a part of this project, a panel of national pain
experts began working in conjunction with the JCAHO Professional
and Technical Advisory Committees, Standards and Survey Procedures
Committee, and the Board of Commissioners. In March of 1999, the
new pain standards were officially approved by JCAHO.7 8 The
standards first appeared in the Accreditation Manual in its 2000-2001
edition, and began to be part of the compliance scoring in 2001.

71See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395x(e),
76 Timothy S. Jost, The Joint

1395bb; 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (2003)
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private
Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REv. 835, 840 (1983).
77JCAHO, Background on the Development of the Joint
Commission Standards on
Pain Management,at http://www.jcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/pain.htm.
78 Id.
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An important and quintessentially American message emerges
from the decision to place one element of the pain standards in the
chapter of the Accreditation Manual entitled "Patient Rights and
Organizational Ethics." Standard RI.1.2.9 states: "Patients have the
right to appropriate assessment and management of pain". 79 Perhaps
more importantly, the new priority for pain management in patient care
is stressed in other chapters of the JCAHO standards as well, including
those pertaining to the assessment and care of patients, rehabilitation,
patient education, continuum of care, and improving organizational
performance. 8 Accredited institutions are expected to meet this
obligation to patients by insuring that each of the following takes place:
1. Assess the existence and nature of pain in all
patients
2. Document the results of the assessment in a
manner that facilitates regular reassessment and
follow-up
3. Determine and assure staff competency in pain
assessment and management
4. Establish policies and procedures which support
the appropriate prescribing of effective pain
medications
5. Educate patients and their families about
effective pain management
6. Address patient needs for symptom
management
81
in the discharge planning process
The JCAHO standards are not merely a means by which institutions
can improve their patient satisfaction surveys. Rather, these standards
are essential to quality patient care because unrelieved pain produces a
plethora of adverse effects of both a psychological and physiological
nature. 82 If each of the six items listed above were to become a vital
part of the institutional culture, then they might provide the missing
elements in professional education, which are the modeling and

79 See JCAHO, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MAN.UAL FOR HOSPITALS
(2000).
80

Id.
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82 Patricia H. Berry and June L. Dahl, The New JCAHO PainStandards: Implications
for Pain ManagementNurses, 8 PAIN MGMT. NURSING 3, 4 (2000).
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mentoring of new knowledge and attitudes so that skills in delivery
can
83
settings.
clinical
actual
in
reinforced
and
refined,
be practiced,
Remarkably, for decades prior to the recent development and
implementation of the JCAHO pain standards, the typical hospital had
been a wasteland in the assessment and management of pain. A major
1977 study, for example, contains the following bleak assessment:
Chief among the difficulties facing anyone who would reform
current practices of pain management in our hospitals is the far from
obvious fact that most aspects of pain work are peripheral to the
attention and the responsibilities of the staff. By responsibilities we
mean not merely the staff s perceived responsibilities, but also its
actual legal and organizational ones. We are asserting, in other
words, that the staff is not genuinely accountable84for much of its
interactionwith or behavior towardpatients in pain.

Further confirmation of the blind eye the typical hospital clinical staff
member turned to pain relief appeared five years later in the New
England Journal of Medicine when Marcia Angell observed that pain
in hospitals 85 was not just occasionally, but "systematically"
undertreated.
At about the same time as the JCAHO standards were being
developed, a new initiative developed under the banner of "Pain: The
Fifth Vital Sign.",86 The American Pain Society (APS), a national
interdisciplinary pain advocacy organization, offered the following
rationale for its significance: "Vital signs are taken seriously. If pain
were assessed with the same zeal as other vital signs, it would have a
much better chance of being treated properly. We need to treat pain as a
vital sign. Quality care means that pain is measured and treated. 87
Critics of the initiative, many of whom are physicians, argue that
because pain is a subjective human experience, and there are no
completely objective means of measuring the pain that someone is
experiencing, then pain can never be legitimately characterized as a

83

Ferris, von Gunten, Emanuel, supra note 58, at 146-147.

SHIZUKO Y. FAGERHAUGH & ANSELM STRAUSS, POLITICS OF PAIN MANAGEMENT:
STAFF-PATIENT INTERACTION 26 (1977).
85 Marcia Angell, The Quality of Mercy, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 98, 99 (1982).
84

The American Pain Society appears to have secured a trademark on the phrase in
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mid-1990's.
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website
at
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87 Id. James Campbell, Presidential Address, American Pain Society, November
11,
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vital sign. 88 However, a close reading of the language above indicates
that the thrust of the APS assertion is not that pain is or should be
considered a vital sign (the 4 classic vital signs are: temperature, pulse,
respiratory rate, and blood pressure), but only that it be assessed with
the same level of concern and consistency as vital signs, because
important information about the patient's condition can thereby be
obtained and utilized. Pain as a fifth vital sign has found its way into
some recent state legislation.89 The most thorough and expansive
adoption of the "pain as fifth vital sign" initiative is that of the Veterans
Health Administration (VHA). As a part of the VHA National Pain
Management Initiative, a detailed manual ("toolkit") was issued. 90
An open question is whether such initiatives as "Pain as the 5th
Vital Sign" can, in the absence of education, training, monitoring, and
appropriate sanctions for noncompliance, motivate a significant and
sustained change in professional practice. One study of the VHA
system following the initial phase of the initiative indicated significant
progress toward the target goals. 91 The remarkable improvement
produced by the initiative was attributed in significant part to the
comprehensive and systematic way in which the initiative was
developed and implemented, utilizing team formation, goal
identification, testing and adaptation of recommended
system changes,
92
and sharing and feedback of outcome information.
The ability of an accredited institution to, and the consistency
with which it actually does, comply with JCAHO standards can be
measured, at least to some degree, by the extent to which the standards
have been incorporated into the daily operations of the facility through
official policies, protocols, rules and regulations. The process of
demonstrating, in this instance to JCAHO surveyors, that the timely
and effective assessment and management of patient pain has actually
88

Shiv Taylor, Anthony E. Voytovich and Robert A. Kozol, Has the Pendulum

Swung Too FarIn PostoperativePain Control?, 186 AM. J. SURG. 472, 475 (2003).
89 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1243.7 (West 2000), providing that
every licensed health facility shall "as a condition of licensure, include pain as an

item to be assessed at the same time as vital signs are taken ... and noted in the
patient's chart in a manner consistent with other vital signs."
90

See VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, TAKE 5: PAIN AS THE 5 T" VITAL SIGN

TOOLKIT (2000).

91 Charles S. Cleeland, et al., Rapid Improvement in Pain Management: The Veterans
Health Administration and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement Collaborative,
19 CLINICAL J. PAIN 298, 303 (2003).
92 Id.
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been "institutionalized" through policies that require it can in turn have
the effect of creating an institutional standard of care. Medical
malpractice cases in many jurisdictions have held that an institution's
own internal policies, procedures, and regulations may serve as a
source of the applicable standard of care. 93 Although the duty to assess
and manage a patient's pain is that of the physician, the JCAHO pain
standards charge the institution with the responsibility of insuring that
its medical and nursing staffs possess, maintain, and consistently apply
the requisite competencies. Under well-established principles of
corporate negligence or vicarious liability, health care institutions and
organizations may be held accountable for the failure
of their
94
professional staffs to provide effective pain management.
While the JCAHO standards appear to have the potential to
produce real changes in knowledge, skills, and attitudes (both
individual and institutional), they will not be realized unless regular
institutional surveys continue to convey the need for compliance. The
seriousness with which institutions view JCAHO accreditation, and the
consequent motivation to insure the ability of the clinical staff
(physicians, nurses, pharmacists) to fulfill this particular patient care
obligation, could provide the otherwise missing link between
professional education and changes in practice patterns.
IV.

CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES

Among the earliest nationally recognized clinical practice guidelines in
the field of pain management were issued in the 1980's by the
American Pain Society. Now in their fifth edition, these guidelines
focus on acute and cancer pain. 95 In 1990, the newly established
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) convened an
interdisciplinary panel of national experts on pain management. They
were charged with the responsibility for developing detailed and
comprehensive clinical guidelines for the assessment and management
of various types of pain. 96 The impetus for these guidelines was the
93

See, e.g., Adams v. Family Planning Assoc. Med. Group, Inc., 733 N.E.2d 766 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2000); Jackson v. Okla. Mem'l Hosp., 909 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1995); Williams
v. St. Claire Med. Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
94 The seminal case on hospital corporate negligence principles is Darling v.
Charleston Cmty Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
See AMERICAN PAIN SOCIETY, PRINCIPLES OF ANALGESIC USE N THE TREATMENT
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96 For a list of the initial panel members and the process by which
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task before them see Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Clinical Practice
95
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continuing data that currently prevailing custom and practice among
physicians "fail[ed] to relieve pain in about half of postoperative
patients," resulting not only in unnecessary patient discomfort, but also
protracted recovery periods and suboptimal patient outcomes. 97 These
guidelines were followed two years later with similarly detailed
guidelines on the management of cancer pain. 98 Publication of the
cancer guidelines coincided with some of the early state initiatives by
medical boards to foster improved pain management among physicians.
In conjunction with its own efforts, for example, the California Medical
Board promulgated a policy and more general guidelines on the
assessment and management of pain, incorporated the AHCPR
guidelines by reference, and even sent a copy of the AHCPR cancer
guidelines to every licensed physician in California.99 California
continues to be in the vanguard of state medical boards, having recently
revised the pain management guidelines, expanding them to cover all
patients with pain, and not merely those with "intractable pain.'19°
The obvious and significant element missing in the proliferation
of pain management clinical practice guidelines in the decade of the
1990's was chronic nonmalignant pain. This was not mere
happenstance. Chronic pain patients are the bane of many physicians
because they often epitomize the "difficult patient" who inordinately
consumes physician and health system resources and energy, and for
whom demonstrable improvement is very difficult to achieve. 10 1
Despite the seemingly wide distribution of these clinical
practice guidelines, and their endorsement by a number of state medical
boards, survey and anecdotal data continued to suggest that
undertreated pain was widespread, serious, and constitutive of a major

Guideline No. 1, Acute Pain Management: Operative or Medical Procedures and
Trauma (1992).
97 Id.

Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Clinical Practice Guideline No. 9,
Management
of
Cancer
Pain
(1994),
available
at
www.hospicepatients.org/clinicalpracticeguidelines 1994.html.
99 Medical Board of California, A Statement by the Medical Board, 50 ACTION
REPORT 1, 4 (July 1994); Medical Board of California, Guidelines for Prescribing
ControlledSubstancesfor Intractable Pain, 51 ACTION REPORT 1, 8 (October 1994).
100 Medical Board of California, Revised Pain Management Guidelines, 87 ACTION
98

REPORT 1, 1 (Oct. 2003).

101 For an in-depth and insightful examination of medicine's profound ambivalence
toward patients with chronic illness, particularly chronic pain, see ARTHUR
KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES: SUFFERING, HEALING, AND THE HUMAN
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public health problem.'1 02 Moreover, one of the most significant barriers
to the consistent delivery of effective pain management was the
widespread fear on the part of physicians that state medical licensing
boards routinely took disciplinary action against those who prescribed
opioid analgesics
to patients who were not in the final stages of a
10 3
terminal illness.
In response, at least in part, to the mounting criticism that state
medical licensing boards continued to be part of the problem of, rather
than part of the solution to the epidemic of undertreated pain in the
United States, the Federation of State Medical Licensing Boards
developed and issued model guidelines for the use of controlled
substances for the treatment of pain. 0 4 These guidelines, from a
substantive perspective, were modest indeed. Unlike the AHCPR
guidelines, they provided neither specific guidance to physicians on
techniques and strategies for assessing and monitoring pain, nor
recommendations of analgesics, dosages, or routes of administration for
particular types of pain. For such guidance, physicians are referred to
the AHCPR Clinical Practice Guidelines. Instead, the Federation
guidelines set out requirements that physicians must meet in order to
demonstrate that their use of opioid analgesics (controlled substances)
for pain management was justified and consistent with sound medical
practice. Those requirements included: evaluation of the patient,
development of a treatment plan, informed consent of the patient,
periodic review of the patient's progress (or lack thereof), consultation
with other physicians as appropriate, detailed and accurate medical
records, and compliance with controlled substances laws and
regulations.' 0 5 If these appear to be quite basic and generic in nature,
that is because they are. Such "requirements" apply to virtually every
aspect of patient care. They have no unique application to the
prescribing of controlled substances in the management of pain.
Arguably, the significance of the guidelines was the policy message
that was not merely implicit, but rather overtly articulated in the
Preamble of the document:

102
103
104

N.Y. Public Health Council, supra note 5.
See, e.g., C. Stratton Hill, Jr., supra note 27, at 293.
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Principles of quality medical practice dictate that patients
have access to appropriate and effective pain relief
" Physicians should view effective pain management as a
part of quality medical practice for all patients with pain
" All physicians should become knowledgeable about
effective methods of pain treatment
" Pain should be assessed and treated promptly, and the
quantity of doses should be adjusted according to the
intensity and duration of the pain
The implicit message of the Federation guidelines, at least when
adopted by a state medical board, is that physicians will not be at risk
of disciplinary action if they prescribe controlled substances to patients
in compliance with the guidelines. What was not clear was whether the
manifest failure of a physician to provide "appropriate and effective"
pain relief to a patient would be deemed to constitute substandard
medical practice and hence render the physician vulnerable to
disciplinary action. The proposition, at least on its face, appears
straightforward: if there can be such a phenomenon as inappropriately
excessive prescribing of opioid analgesics that leads to medical board
disciplinary action (e.g. the Hoover case), then with the adoption of the
Federation Guidelines there should also be a recognized phenomenon
of inadequate prescribing of opioid analgesics that also leads to medical
board disciplinary action. Both should amount to substandard patient
care and unprofessional practice. In the absence of such a balanced
medical board approach, the actual message to physicians would likely
be that while you can continue to be subject to disciplinary action for
so-called "overprescribing" of opioid analgesics, there will be no
commensurate risk for the converse. In other words, there is no such
thing as "underprescribing" insofar as medical boards are concerned. If
that were the case, the guidelines would be highly unlikely to
materially alter the extremely conservative approach to opioid
prescribing that had produced the epidemic of undertreated pain.
The first state medical board to signal that allowing patients to
experience unnecessary suffering would merit disciplinary action was
Oregon. In March of 1999, the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners
(OBME) filed a complaint against Paul Bilder. 10 7 The complaint
106 id.
107
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alleged six instances of conduct that constituted unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct and gross or repeated negligence in the practice
of medicine. The episodes of misconduct spanned a period of time from
1993-1998.108 Bilder's alleged misconduct in these cases fell into one
of two categories: 1) failure to provide adequate pain relief to dying
patients, and 2) administering paralytic agents to ventilator-dependent
patients without also providing anxiolytic agents. One of the bitter
ironies of the Bilder case was that five out of six episodes involved care
at a facility by the name of Mercy Medical Center. 10 9 In September of
1999, Bilder and the OBME entered into a Stipulated Order pursuant to
which he was required to enroll in a program of peer evaluation and
education under the auspices of the Oregon Medical Association,
complete a course on physician-patient communication, and continue to
receive psychiatric treatment.'
The painful saga of Paul Bilder
continues. According to the OBME website, another Stipulated Order
was entered in April of 2003, pursuant to which Bilder received a
public reprimand, 10 years of probation, and was required to receive
continuing medical education, make quarterly reports to the OBME,
submit to monitoring of his practice, and continue with psychological
counseling.' 11
The OBME prosecution of Bilder cannot be attributed to the
formal adoption of the Federation Guidelines. However, one month
after the filing of the complaint against Bilder, the OBME did issue a
policy statement on pain management that was consistent with the
philosophy and policy behind the Federation Guidelines." 2 It is
10 8

id.

'09 The Oregon Board of Medical Examiners might appear to be vulnerable to the
critique that it should not have required a critical mass of 6 suffering patients over a
period of 5 years before it was moved to take action against Dr. Bilder. However,
such a critique misses the more fundamental question of why the medical staff of
Mercy Medical Center did not take action much earlier. It strains credulity to suggest
that the medical staff, nursing staff, and hospital administration did not know about
the threat to patient care this physician posed. Given the well-known limitations of
financial and human resources all state medical boards face, they cannot reasonably
provide the first line of defense against substandard medical practice. That
responsibility must fall upon the local community of health care institutions and
professionals.
10 Erin Hoover Barnett, Case Marks Big Shift in Pain Policy, THE OREGONIAN, Sept.
2, 1999, availableat http://www.oregonlive.com:80/news/99/09/st090201 .html.
11 Oregon Board of Medical Examiners, Licensing Action Report, April 22, 2005,
availableat http://www.bme.state.or.us/licensactionrpt.html.
112 Oregon Board of Medical Examiners, Statement of Philosophy
on Pain
Management, BME REPORT, Fall 1999.
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interesting, although for the most part speculative, to consider the role
that Oregon's legalization of physician-assisted suicide has had on its
public policy of advocating for improved pain management by
physicians. Concerns have been raised that undertreated pain and
substandard symptom management are major factors in patient requests
for physician-assisted suicide. 1 3 These concerns have persisted despite
six years of data on the experiment with physician-assisted suicide
indicating that unrelieved pain is far down on the list of reasons most
often given by patients who request and receive physician-assisted
suicide. 114 In 2003, the California Medical Board (CMB) became the
second state licensing board to take disciplinary action against a
physician for failure to provide appropriate pain relief. While the
charges against the physician suggested multiple instances of failing to
provide appropriate pain relief to a patient dying of mesothelioma in a
skilled nursing facility, 1 5 the stipulated decision and order was very
narrowly crafted and focused entirely on the demonstrable failure to
know the form in which certain analgesics were available. 1' 6 The CMB
action against Dr. Whitney also indicates that medical boards can take
appropriate disciplinary action based upon a single instance of
substandard or unprofessional practice. One of the justifications that
had been offered for the failure of the CMB to take any disciplinary
action against Dr. Chin, despite the negative review of his care by the
CMB expert, was that it involved only a single instance, rather than an
established pattern and practice. 117
In 2004, the Federation issued revisions to its Model
Guidelines, in an apparent effort to reinforce the fundamental
proposition inherent in the original document of 1998 that the prompt,
effective, and consistent assessment and management of pain is an
integral component of quality patient care. But the 2004 revisions also
sought to transform the very nature of the document - from model
guidelines to model policy. Indeed, the "Model Policy" now contains
the disclaimer that it is "not intended to establish clinical practice
guidelines nor is it intended to be inconsistent with controlled
113Kathleen

M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient

Requestsfor Physician-AssistedSuicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMP. MGMT. 289 (1991).
114

Oregon Department of Human Services, Sixth Annual Report on Oregon 's Death

with Dignity Act, March 10, 2004.
115In the matter of the accusation against Eugene B. Whitney, M.D., Case No. 12
2002 133376, filed March 13, 2003.
116 In the matter of the accusation against Eugene B. Whitney, M.D., Case No. 12
2002 133376, decided December 15, 2003.
117 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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substances laws and regulations.""11 8 Of particular note is language
indicating that the inappropriate prescribing of analgesics can constitute
substandard practice regardless of whether it consists of
overprescribing or underprescribing.11 9 The Federation reports that as
of January of 2004,
22 state medical boards had adopted all or part of
20
the guidelines.'

Changing medical board thinking about the place of pain relief
in patient care, and the role of medical boards in insuring that
physicians have the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes to respond
appropriately to the pain and suffering of their patients, is a
monumental task. 121 The myths, misinformation, and phobias related to
controlled substances and the "untestable hypothesis" of a patient's
subjective experience of pain are deeply embedded in the culture of
medicine and the minds of many of its current practitioners. 122 Further
confirmatory evidence of the remarkable persistence of this
phenomenon was provided by the results of a recent study of medical
board disciplinary attitudes and practices. 123 The details of the Bilder
case in Oregon were described to state medical board members and
staff. When asked how likely the respondent's board would be to take
disciplinary action against a physician if similar complaints were
corroborated upon investigation, 11 respondents believed action would
be almost certain (a likelihood of greater than 90%); 14 respondents
thought it would be probable (a 60-90% chance); 3 considered it to be
possible (40-60%); 2 thought it was unlikely (10-40%); 3 offered other
broad ranges 60-100% and 40-90%), while 5 were unable to offer any
prediction. 124 Such data, particularly the regulators who believed there
was a less than 50% chance that the clinical facts of a Bilder-type case
Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc., Model Policyfor the
Use
11 of ControlledSubstancesfor the Treatment of Pain,May 2004.
18

9Id.

120

Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc., Prescriptionfor

Change: Federationto Strengthen Pain Treatment Policy, March 2004. For a more
detailed description and analysis of the use of these model guidelines by the states see
Aaron M. Gilson, David E. Joranson, & Martha A. Maurer, Improving State Medical
BoardPolicies:Influence of a Model, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 119 (2003).
121 For a glimpse into the mindset of the average physician and medical board
member, one which has fashioned and defended an "ethic of underprescribing," see
Ann M. Martino, supra note 24.
122 See Joranson and Gilson, supra note 26, and accompanying text.
123See Diane E. Hoffman & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in
Oversight of Physician Opioid Prescribingfor Pain: The Role of State Medical
Boards,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 21 (2003).
124
Id. at 31.
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would not prompt their board to undertake any disciplinary action, not
even so much as a letter of reprimand or a demand for completion of a
continuing medical education program in the relief of pain and
suffering, tends to offer strong corroboration to a charge that physician
Eric Cassell made against the medical profession well over a decade
ago:
The test of a system of medicine should be its adequacy in the face of
suffering: this book starts from the premise that modem medicine
fails that test. In fact, the central assumptions on which twentieth-

century medicine
is founded provide no basis for an understanding of
25
suffering.'

Perhaps in recognition of these realities, the Federation has
announced yet another series of "workshops" for members of the
"medical regulatory community" for 2004-2005. Among the objectives
of the educational program are:
"
*
*
"
"

Creating a regulatory environment that encourages
accessible and appropriate pain care;
Identifying policy/legislative barriers to appropriate pain
care;
Gaining an understanding of abuse, diversion and the
appropriate regulatory responses;
Distinguishing criminal vs. negligent/incompetent vs.
acceptable practice;
Defining key terms and concepts related to pain and
126
addiction.

The second, third, and fourth items above relate directly to another
important change in the 2004 Model Policy, i.e., the invocation of the
state attorney general as a potential agent of change in the regulatory
law and policy of pain management. The Model Policy encourages
state medical boards to work cooperatively with their state attorney
general to review state policies and regulations that may impede the
effective use of opioids to relieve pain.

125

ERiC

J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE vii

(1991).
126
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Traditionally, state attorneys general, as the chief law
enforcement officer, were focused on waging the war on drugs, i.e.
investigating and prosecuting instances of drug diversion. There has
never been a declared war on pain, and even if there had been, as there
has been with the war on cancer, it would in all likelihood be viewed as
entirely within the domain of medicine, with no recognized legal
implications whatsoever. Even as the evidence of the epidemic of
undertreated pain became overwhelming in the decade of the 1990's,
strongly implicating drug control policies as one of the barriers to pain
relief, only a small number of state attorneys general demonstrated any
awareness that their office might have a role and a responsibility in
addressing the problem.1 27 Quite recently, however, a former President
of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), Oklahoma
Attorney General Drew Edmondson, made improving end-of-life care
the presidential initiative for the organization in 2002-2003. As part of
this initiative, NAAG sponsored a series of regional "listening
conferences" throughout the country at which members of the
organization and/or their staff could hear from leaders in the movement
to improve end-of-life care. Three questions were the focus of the
listening conferences:
*
*
*

Will my pain be managed?
Will my wishes be known and honored?
28
Will I receive competent care?

Sections of the NAAG report written by contributing specialists discuss
the barriers to a favorable response to these questions and prospects for
their removal. What is significant about this aspect of the report is not
that any new and different information is available, but that a new
audience is, at least in theory, receiving it with some limited
expectation of a response. The political reality, of course, is that no
state attorney general is likely to be held accountable by voters for not
vigorously seeking to overcome state legal and regulatory barriers to
pain management, advance care planning, or quality end-of-life care.
Consequently, the role of the attorney general in breaking down these
well-known and long-standing barriers will be highly idiosyncratic,

127

See Nevada State Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa, Death with Dignity and

Caringin Nevada -A Planfor Action (1997).

128 National Association of Attorneys General, Improving End-Of-Life Care: The Role

of Attorneys General(2003).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[VOL.8.3:519

depending
on the personal perspective and motivation of the office
29
holder. 1

The other major player in the regulatory barrier to effective pain
management is the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
Pursuant to authority conferred by the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act (CSA), physicians in the United States are required to obtain DEA
registration in order to prescribe, dispense, or administer any controlled
drugs to their patients, and they must do so only for "legitimate medical
' 130

reasons."

Controlled substances are divided into five schedules depending
upon their potential for abuse. Schedule I drugs have been deemed to
have a high abuse potential and no accepted medical use in the United
131
States. They include heroin, marijuana, LSD, peyote, and mescaline.
Schedule II drugs are those that are most effective in the treatment of
moderate to severe persistent pain, e.g., morphine, meperidine
32
(Demerol), oxycodone, and fentanyl.1
Both the language and the legislative history of the CSA
indicate that it was not intended to confer upon the DEA any authority
to regulate medical decisions such as when to prescribe a particular
controlled substance for a patient, or at what dosage or for what
duration. 133 The DEA's representation to physicians has been:
controlled substances have legitimate clinical usefulness, and the
prescriber should not hesitate to consider prescribing them when they
The Attorney General of Maine, for example, co-sponsored with the Maine
Hospice Council, their own "Listening Conference" in September of 2004 entitled
Consumer Protection and End-of-Life Care in Maine, described at
www.MaineHospiceCouncil.org.
130
Uniform
Controlled
Substances
Act
(1994),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucsa94.htm.
131 See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, PHYSICIAN'S MANUAL 3 (1990).
129

32

1

id.

The extent to which the CSA may, explicitly or implicitly, empower the
Department of Justice to regulate any aspect of medical practice related to the
prescribing of controlled substances has now become a major issue in the federal
courts. The State of Oregon has challenged a directive of Attorney General Ashcroft
that would sanction any physician who provided a lethal prescription of a controlled
substance pursuant to the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. Ashcroft contends that
writing a prescription for a controlled substance for the purpose of assisting a patient
in committing suicide is against the public interest and can never be for a legitimate
medical purpose. At the heart of the State of Oregon's successful challenge of the
Ashcroft directive is the argument as a matter of both reasonable statutory
construction of the CSA, as well as sound constitutional principles, regulation of
medical practice is the responsibility of the states, not the Attorney General of the
United States. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
133
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are indicated for the comfort and well-being of patients.' 34 In what
appears to be a response to the charges that DEA practices constitute
one of the barriers (physicians' fear of regulatory scrutiny) to pain
relief for patients, the DEA issued a news release in October of 2003,
135
posted on its website, entitled "The Myth of the 'Chilling Effect."",
In this press release the DEA states that since FY 1999, the DEA has
pursued sanctions for violations of the CSA on less than
one tenth of
36
one percent of the physicians with DEA registrations.'
In 2001, the DEA issued a joint statement in conjunction with
21 health organizations entitled "Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing
Abuse of Pain Medications: A Critical Balancing Act."' 37 The concept
of "balance" has become prominent in recent efforts to address the
epidemic of undertreated pain. I will consider it in the next section. The
most direct and immediate impetus for issuing the joint statement, and
the compelling need to persuade the DEA to join in its issuance, was
the media frenzy surrounding recent reports of a growing problem of
the abuse and diversion of a particular Schedule II drug - Oxycontin.
Oxycontin is a timed-release form of oxycodone that was
developed and marketed by Purdue Pharma L.P. for patients with
moderate to severe chronic pain. It was approved by the FDA in 1995,
and soon thereafter became the most profitable item in the Purdue
pharmacopia. 138 Beginning in 2000, reports began to surface that in
certain parts of the country (e.g., Maine, West Virginia) Oxcontin was
being abused and diverted to a disproportionate degree. The reason was
that by merely crushing the capsule, the timed-release feature could be
circumvented, and a dosage of oxycontin intended for a 12-hour period
could be ingested at one time. 39 The U.S. General Accounting Office
was asked to investigate, and in doing so focused on three issues: 1)
how Oxycontin was promoted; 2) what factors contributed to the abuse
13 4

Id at 1124.
135 DEA Division, The Myth of the "Chilling Effect, " News Release, October 30,
2003, availableat www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/prl 03003.html.
136 For a contrary interpretation see David B. Brushwood, The Chilling
Effect is No
Myth,
Pain
&
The
Law,
January
1,
2004,
available at
www.painandthelaw.org/mayday/brushwood_010104.php.
137 American Pain Society, Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing Abuse of Pain
Medications:
A
Critical
Balancing
Act,
available
at
www.ampainsoc.org/advocacy/promoting.htm.
138 General Accounting Office, Oxycontin Abuse and Diversion Efforts to
Address the
Problem, GAO-04-1 10 (December 2003).
139 For a journalist's extensive, detailed, and controversial account of the Oxycontin
abuse phenomenon see BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: A" WONDER" DRUG'S TRAIL OF
ADDICTION AND DEATH (2003).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[VOL.8.3:519

and diversion of Oxcontin; and 3) what actions had been taken to
address Oxycontin abuse and diversion. 140 The GAO essentially
declined to blame any particular party, including Purdue, for the abuse
of Oxycontin. Indeed, the GAO found that the data on abuse and
diversion were not reliable, complete, or timely.14 1 It also noted, in a
commendatory fashion, the collaborative efforts by Purdue and the
FDA to address the problem of Oxycontin abuse and diversion once it
was recognized.
The genuine concern on the part of the advocates for improved
pain management that the availability of a valuable opioid analgesic for
chronic pain patients might be severely curtailed because a small group
of non-patients was illegally obtaining and abusing it reflects the
perception that law and public policy have been highly supportive of
the "War on Drugs" and historically indifferent to the need for a "War
on Pain." Advocates for improved pain relief have not sought to
trivialize the legitimacy of the first, but they have sought a genuine
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the latter. The new watchword
in this movement has become the concept of "balance."
V.

THE CONCEPT OF BALANCE IN PAIN POLICY

The pursuit of balance in any domain of human endeavor presupposes a
prior state or condition of imbalance. In the case of pain and its relief,
the preexisting imbalance was largely attributable to the "War on
Drugs", in particular those controlled substances that are integral to the
management of moderate to severe pain, i.e., opioid analgesics. In the
absence of a countervailing "War on Pain", federal and state policy
compromised both the willingness and the ability of physicians to make
pain relief a priority in patient care, and physician fear of regulatory
scrutiny by both state and federal agencies became one of the wellrecognized barriers to pain relief. This was so despite the clear
legislative intent of the Controlled Substances Act that the legislation
provided no authority for the DEA to regulate medical decisions, and
the explicit recognition that controlled substances have important
medical uses in the relief of pain and other distressing symptoms of
illness. Because state medical boards routinely disciplined physicians
for over-prescribing opioid analgesics, while turning a blind eye to a
burgeoning epidemic of undertreated pain, it appeared that physicians
and their licensing boards had become conscripts in the "War on
140
141

GAO, supra note 124, at 3.
Id. at 32.
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Drugs", pain patients had become the noncombatant casualties of that
war, and a core value of medicine, the duty to relieve pain and
suffering, thereby suffered grave collateral damage. Although the term
"balance" was not invoked, both national and international
organizations began, within the last ten years, to call upon
governmental agencies at all levels to recognize the manifestly negative
impact that some drug control policies have upon legitimate vatients
and the health care professionals responsible for their care. 42 The
pendulum had swung far in the direction of detecting and punishing
drug diversion, and away from concerns about the availability and
utilization of controlled substances for legitimate medical purposes.
In 2000, the Pain and Policy Studies Group (PPSG) of the
University of Wisconsin Comprehensive Cancer Center published an
extensive analysis of federal and state policies related to or
significantly impacting pain relief.143 The elusive ideal of balance in
such policies is between control, i.e., prevention or detection of drug
abuse or diversion, and availability, i.e., ensuring both the adequate
supply and distribution (the prescribing, dispensing, and administering)
of controlled substances for legitimate medical needs. 144 The federal
CSA embodies the need for and the appropriateness of a balanced
public policy, explicitly noting as it does the multiplicity of legitimate
45
medical purposes for which the scheduled drugs might be prescribed. 1
Many state laws regulating the availability and distribution of
controlled substances are more restrictive than the CSA and lack the
explicit recognition that such laws, as a matter of sound public policy,
must not prevent diversion of controlled substances at the cost of
insuring their availability for patients whose proper treatment is
dependent upon them. These state laws are based upon the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act (USCA) drafted at about the same time as
142

See, e.g., the International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International

Narcotics Control Board for 1995: Availability of Opiates for Medical Needs,
available at http://www.incb.org/e/ind ar.htm, calling upon national governments to
ascertain whether national narcotics laws create impediments to the prescribing of
narcotic drugs to patients; the Institute of Medicine Committee on Care at the End of
Life, ApproachingDeath: Improving Care at the End of Life (1997) calling for reform
of drug prescription laws, burdensome regulations, and state medical board policies
that impede effective use of opioids to relieve pain and suffering.
143University of Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group, Achieving Balance in
Federal
and
State
Pain
Policy
(2002),
available
at
www.medscho.wisc.edu/painpolicy.
144 Id.

at 13.

145Controlled

Substances Act of 1970. Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1242.
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the federal CSA. The USCA, unlike the CSA, does not specifically
charge states with the responsibility to insure the availability and
accessibility of controlled substances for legitimate medical
purposes.
The goal of the PPSG criteria for evaluating state law and
policy was to identify provisions with a tendency to either enhance or
impede pain management. 147 The premise underlying this approach
would appear to be that such laws and policies had as their primary, if
not their sole consideration, the prevention of drug diversion and the
achievement of control. The open question the development and
application of the evaluational criteria sought to answer was whether
any semblance of balance had been forfeited in the zealous pursuit of
that control. The PPSG criteria intended to identify provisions that may
enhance pain management are as follows:
"
*
*
*
"
*
"
"

Controlled substances are recognized as necessary for the
public health
Pain management is recognized as part of general
medical practice
Medical use of opioids is recognized as legitimate
professional practice
Pain management is encouraged
Practitioners' concerns about regulatory scrutiny are
addressed
Prescription amount alone is recognized as insufficient to
determine legitimacy of prescribing
Physical dependence or analgesic tolerance are not
confused with "addiction"
148
Other provisions that may enhance pain management

One general observation about this set of criteria is that it
strongly reflects the modem, "enlightened" view of pain management
in patient care. With regard to the first criteria, for example, it was
really only at the point that an epidemic of undertreated pain was
deemed to constitute a major public health problem that the use of
controlled substances in the management of moderate to severe chronic
pain was directly linked to public health. Similarly, the second, third,
146

Joranson and Gilson, supra note 30, at 183.

147 University of Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group, supra note 140, at 17.
148 1d. at 17.
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and fourth criteria rarely found their way into law and public policy
until the decade of the 1990's, between 10 and 20 after the barriers to
effective pain management had been consistently established in the
literature of the health professions. 149 The sixth criteria relates to the
purpose of state intractable pain legislation, which as previously noted,
sought to constrain the propensity of state medical boards to discipline
physicians solely on the basis that they had prescribed opioid
analgesics to their patients with chronic nonmalignant pain.' 50 The
seventh criteria is based upon the widespread confusion, not only
among those involved in efforts to control drug diversion, but also
among practicing physicians and state medical board members, that
drug addiction is not limited to psychological dependence, but rather
includes physiological dependence and the phenomenon of analgesic
tolerance. 151

The criteria that are believed to have the potential to impede
pain management are the following:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Opioids are implied to be a last resort
Medical use of opioids is implied to be outside legitimate
medical practice
The belief that opioids hasten death is perpetuated
Physical dependence or analgesic tolerance are confused
with "addiction"
Medical decisions are restricted
Length of prescription validity is restricted
Practitioners are subject to additional prescription
requirements
Other provisions that may impede
pain management
152
Provisions that are ambiguous

All but the last of the second set of criteria constitute efforts on the part
of public policy makers to infringe on medical judgment and decision
making in patient care in pursuit of the goal of constraining drug
diversion. Such policies are in conflict with the thrust of the federal
CSA, as well as with the generally accepted proposition that nonphysicians are ill-equipped to critique or regulate medical practice.
149

See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.

150 See supra notes
'5'
152

32-38 and accompanying text.
See Joranson and Gilson, supra note 26.
University of Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group, supra note 140, at 17.
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The bulk of the PPSG guide to evaluation of pain policy is
devoted to a detailed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction (including federal
legislation and regulation) analysis of law and policy. For example, in
the examination of the Rhode Island Intractable Pain Treatment Act,
five of the criteria are found to be applicable. 153 The act's definition of
intractable pain is found to exemplify two of the criteria that may
impede pain management, in that it implies that opioids are a last resort
after all other measures have demonstrably failed, and it also implies
that opioids are not an integral aspect of professional practice.1 54 The
act's definition reads as follows:
"Intractable pain," a pain state in which the cause of the pain cannot
be removed or otherwise treated and which in the generally accepted
course of medical practice no relief or cure of the cause of the pain is
possible or none has been found after reasonable 1efforts
that have
55
been documented in the physician's medical records.

The total number of positive and negative provisions identified for each
state using the evaluation criteria provided the basis for an overall
grade (ranging from high A or B+ to low D+, D, or F, with no minus
grades utilized). Equal weight was given to positive and negative
provisions.1 56 When the final calculations were completed, no state
received a grade of A or F. Nine states received a grade of B or B+ in
2000, whereas 20 received D+ or D. The remaining received a grade of
C or C+. 57 A lower grade indicates a disproportionate number of law
or policy provisions that may impede pain management. No necessary
connection should be presumed between a low overall grade and the
effectiveness of the jurisdiction's drug diversion control policy. The

PPSG does not endorse the proposition that erecting or maintaining
barriers to effective pain management in any way constitutes a
plausible or a legitimate drug diversion control strategy. 158
In 2003 the same evaluation criteria were again applied to the
states. Fourteen states (Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
153 R.I. GEN. LAWS

§ 5-37.4-3 (1997).
154 University of Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group, supra note 140, at 364.
155 See supra note 150, at

§ 5-37.4-2(B).

156 University of Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group, Achieving Balance in
State
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Card

(2003),

available

at

www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy,
at 10.
57
1Id. at 13.
158 Id. at 7, noting that a system of controls is necessary to prevent drug diversion and
abuse, but should not be intended to achieve this objective by interfering with the
legitimate medical uses for which they are intended.
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Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, South
Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin) raised their grade,
whereas one (Ohio) went down.1 59 The major factors contributing to an
improved grade were the adoption of model board guidelines for pain
management or board policies encouraging the use of opioids as
appropriate for the relief of moderate to severe pain.' 60 Ohio's lower
grade was the result of the addition of language to state law suggesting
that the use of opioids at the end of life may hasten death.161
The concept of balance has permeated other efforts to shape
public policy in the areas of promotion of pain management and the
prevention of drug diversion and abuse. For example, in 2001, 21
health care organizations and the DEA issued a joint statement calling
for the need to balance the promotion of pain relief and the prevention
of abuse of pain medications. 162 The general thrust of the joint
statement, developed through a collaboration of the DEA, the Last Acts
Partnership, and the Pain & Policy Studies Group of the University of
Wisconsin, was that health care professionals and those involved in law
enforcement and regulatory agencies have a shared responsibility "for
ensuring that prescription pain medications are available to the patients
who need them and for preventing these drugs from becoming a source
of harm or abuse." Similarly, the American Alliance of Cancer Pain
Initiatives issued a statement on state prescription monitoring programs
in 2002 that expressed the organization's commitment to "assuring
their [opioid analgesics] availability for legitimate medical purposes as
well as preventing their diversion and abuse. 16 3 More recently, the
collaboration that produced the "joint statement" in 2001 produced a
compendium of frequently asked questions on prescription pain
medications, and responses to them, for health care professionals and
law enforcement personnel. 164 The stated goal of this document was "to
59

' Id. at 13.

6

1 1 Id. at

15.

161Interestingly,

similar language can be found in Justice O'Connor's often-quoted

concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997), wherein
she seeks to reassure physicians that such a "double effect" of strong pain
medications in the care of dying patients is not proscribed by law and ought not to be
confused with physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.
162 Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing Abuse of Pain Medication: A Critical
Balancing Act, availableat http://www.ampainsoc.org/advocacy/promoting.html.

163 http:// www.aacpi.org/regulatory/html.

164 Office of Drug Enforcement Administration, Prescription Pain Medications:
Frequently Asked Questions and Answers for Health Care Professionals, at

http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/pain-meds-faqs.htm
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achieve a better balance in addressing the treatment
of pain while
' 65
preventing abuse and diversion of pain medications."'
The concept of balance is not without its critics among
advocates for improved pain management. One of the most vociferous
critiques argues that the concept of balance overtly, or at least tacitly
accepts the validity of the proposition that physicians and other health
care professionals with prescribing authority for controlled substances
have a responsibility to balance the needs of their patients for pain
medication with some societal interest in preventing drug diversion.
The insinuation of the concept of balance into the patient-professional
relationship as a side constraint, so the argument runs, corrupts the
health professional's singular responsibility to act only so as to pursue
the best interests of the patient. From this perspective, the concept of
balance demands more of prescribing professionals than merely
providing competent pain relief within the scope of legitimate clinical
practice. It imposes the additional responsibility, for example, to assess
whether prescribing an opioid analgesic to a patient who requires one
might, in the context of the patient's living situation, increase the risk
that the controlled substance is diverted to non-clinical and hence
illegitimate use. If that were the case, so the principle of balance seems
to maintain, the prescriber
might properly elect not to provide the
66
needed medication.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The barriers to effective pain relief, particularly when relief requires the
use of prescription analgesics, lie mostly within the medical domain in
that they relate to the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of physicians.
Even those barriers pertaining to the regulatory scrutiny of prescribing
practices (real or perceived) produce their impact on patient care
because of the negative attitudes they engender in physicians with
regard to the duty to provide effective pain relief. The focus on
165

Id. Shortly after this document was posted on the DEA website, it was removed

and replaced with a notice that stated, in pertinent part: "The document contained
misstatements and has therefore been removed from the DEA website. DEA wishes to
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attitudes is particularly important because of the data strongly
suggesting that they are the most resistant to change through continuing
professional education. 167
Among the policy initiatives I have
considered, IPTAs, statutory mandates for physician education, and
model guidelines or medical board policy statements are all directed, in
large measure, to modifying physician attitudes. At the present time
there is'no real evidence confirming that these initiatives have had any
effect upon the custom and practice of most physicians. The emphasis
on "balance" in state and federal policies is directed primarily at
legislators and regulators, not health care professionals.
The JCAHO accreditation standards related to the assessment
and management of pain, at least in theory, hold the most promise for
changing physician attitudes and practice.1 68 Accredited institutions,
particularly hospitals through their medical and nursing staffs, can
become the crucibles of change. These institutions, in order to secure or
maintain JCAHO accreditation, are charged with insuring that their
professional staffs have up-to-date -knowledge and skills in the
assessment and management of pain. Perhaps even more importantly,
those with leadership roles on the professional staffs can and should
become models for and mentors of their colleagues, using both example
and moral suasion to motivate their colleagues who are deficient in
knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes to improve their performance. It is at
the institutional level that standards of professional practice can be
most effectively established and enforced. If JCAHO continues through
its survey process to hold accredited institutions responsible for
insuring that patients receive prompt, thorough, consistent, and
competent pain assessment and management, individuals with attitudes
and practices that are inconsistent with that objective will be forced to
change or leave.
I have noted in this article the serious, adverse sequelae of
vigorously waging a "War on Drugs" in the absence of so much as even
a declaration of a "War on Pain": physicians and the medical boards
that license them become conscripts; pain patients become
noncombatant casualties; and a core value of medicine - the duty to
relieve pain - suffers grave collateral damage. This state of affairs
epitomizes the complete absence of "balance" in national pain policy.
The missing factor that explains why professional education
plus attitude adjustment equals changes (improvements) in the clinical
management of pain is accountability. IPTAs, for example, in no way
167
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seek to require physicians to provide appropriate pain relief Similarly,
medical board policies and guidelines that merely encourage physicians
to assess and manage their patients' pain, but threaten no disciplinary
action when they do not, amount to little more than policy window
dressing - mere rhetoric rather than genuine reform. Only disciplinary
actions such as those in Oregon of Dr. Bilder and California of Dr.
Whitney, or judgments such as those in James and Bergman, introduce
genuine accountability into the equation. Going forward, public policy
on pain should strongly reinforce the proposition that competent pain
management is an essential element of minimally acceptable patient
care. 169
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